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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood**
and Alex Battey'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year represents the last survey period in which the "old" Georgia
Evidence Code, Official Code of Georgia Annotated title 24,' reigns. The
"new" Georgia Evidence Code,2 which amends the O.C.G.A. and
conforms in large part to the Federal Rules of Evidence, takes effect
January 1, 2013. Therefore, next year's survey will undoubtedly report
the ways in which Georgia courts have coped with the extensive changes.
For now, courts continue to apply the existing Georgia Rules of
Evidence. Cases covered in this Article were published between June 1,
2011 and May 31, 2012, 4 and speak to a variety of topics in Georgia

* Founding Partner in the firm of Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
Mercer University (B.A., 1981); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (1982-1984); Student Writing Editor (1983-1984).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Of Counsel in the firm of Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
Georgia State University (B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978).
Former Reporter of Decisions for the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of
Appeals. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
Washington and Lee University (B.A., 2006); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D.,
2011). Editorial Board, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (20092010); Senior Articles Editor (2010-2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2010).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2012).
3. Id.§1.
4. For an analysis of evidence during the prior survery period, see John E. Hall, Jr. &
W. Scott Henwood, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 153
(2011).
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evidence law, including Fourth Amendment search and seizure,5 the
business records hearsay exception,6 the rule of completeness, 7 the
scope of expert witness testimony,' and spoliation presumptions.9
II. CASE LAW UPDATE
The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed and issued two opinions on
cases discussed in last year's article, one affirming0 and one reversing" the Georgia Court of Appeals.' 2 Interestingly enough, both cases
involved different aspects of Fourth Amendment protection against
unlawful search and seizure."
FourthAmendment and Cell Phone Searches
Last year's article reported a decision by the court of appeals in which
the court held that a warrantless search of electronic data stored on the
defendant's cell phone was reasonable as part of a search of the
defendant's vehicle incident to arrest. 4 The decision by the court of
appeals was important as it represented the intersection of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, 5 specifically vehicle searches incident to
arrests after Arizona v. Gant," and the novel legal issues emerging
with the advent of certain technologies. 7 The court of appeals in
Hawkins v. State' s first held that the search incident to arrest of the
defendant's vehicle and cell phone was lawful under Gant, 9 in which
the United States Supreme Court held that during a lawful search
incident to arrest, an officer may search the passenger compartment of
the arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein when it is "reasonable

A.

5. State v. Thackston, 289 Ga. 412,716 S.E.2d 517 (2011); Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga.
785, 723 S.E.2d 924 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Forrester v. State, 315 Ga. App. 1, 726 S.E.2d 476 (2012).
7. Westbrook v. State, 291 Ga. 60, 727 S.E.2d 473 (2012).
8. Dendy v. Wells, 312 Ga. App. 309, 718 S.E.2d 14 (2011).
9. Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ga. App. 1, 720 S.E.2d 329 (2011);
Paggett v. Kroger Co., 311 Ga. App. 690, 716 S.E.2d 792 (2011).
10. Hawkins, 290 Ga. at 788, 723 S.E.2d at 926.
11. Thackston, 289 Ga. at 415, 716 S.E.2d at 521.
12. Hall & Henwood, supra note 4, at 159-61.
13. Hawkins, 290 Ga. at 785,723 S.E.2d at 925; Thackston, 289 Ga. at 412,716 S.E.2d
at 517-18.
14. Hawkins v. State, 307 Ga. App. 253, 255, 704 S.E.2d 886, 889 (2010); Hal &
Henwood, supra note 4, at 159-60.
15. See Hall & Henwood, supra note 4, at 160.
16. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
17. See Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 257-59, 704 S.E.2d at 891-92.
18. 307 Ga. App. 253, 704 S.E.2d 886 (2010).
19. Id. at 255, 259, 704 S.E.2d at 889, 892.
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to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the
vehicle." 20 Particularly, the court of appeals stated, "When an officer is
authorized to search in a vehicle for a specific object and, in the course
of his search, comes across a container that reasonably might contain the
object of his search, the officer is authorized to open the container and
search within it for the object."2'1 The court of appeals noted that in
light of the vast amount of information that the cellular phones of today
are capable of storing, they should be treated by courts like containers
"that store] thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete
files."22
The Georgia Supreme Court in Hawkins v. State23 affirmed the court
of appeals's decision, reiterating that cell phones could be treated in the
same manner as a traditional physical container.' In Hawkins, the
police observed Hawkins texting as she arrived to conduct a narcotics
transaction and, almost immediately after this observation, the officers
received a text message from her. 5 Further, the officers found the cell
phone within Hawkins's vehicle during the search incident to arrest.26
The defendant argued that a cell phone should not be considered a
traditional container for the purposes of a search incident to arrest
because it does not contain tangible objects.27 However, the supreme
court disagreed and held that "a cell phone is 'roughly analogous' to a
container that properly can be opened and searched for electronic data,
similar to a traditional container that can be opened to search for
tangible objects of evidence." 2 The court then stated that in Hawkins
it was reasonable for the police to believe that the object of their search,
particularly text messages, would be found in the cell phone.29
The supreme court disagreed with the dissenting opinion of the court
of appeals's decision in Hawkins that the "high volume of information
stored in the cell phone" should change its character from that of a
traditional container 0 However, the supreme court noted that caution

20. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.
21. Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 256, 704 S.E.2d at 890.
22. Id. at 258, 704 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Search and Seizures in a
Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REv. 531, 555 (2005)).
23. 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924 (2012).
24. Id. at 786, 723 S.E.2d at 925.
25. Id. at 785, 723 S.E.2d at 925.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 786, 723 S.E.2d at 925.
28. Id. (quoting Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 257, 704 S.E.2d at 890).
29. Id. at 786, 723 S.E.2d at 925-26.
30. Id. at 787, 723 S.E.2d at 926; see Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 265-66, 704 S.E.2d at
896-97.
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should be applied in setting the scope of a permissible search of a cell
phone incident to arrest.3" Agreeing with the court of appeals in its
discussion of the permissible scope of the search, the supreme court
stated:
"[Wle must apply the principles set forth in traditional 'container' cases
to searches for electronic data with great care and caution." ...
"[SIearch must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the
object of the search. [Cit.]". . . Thus, when "the object of the search is
to discover certain text messages, for instance, there is no need for the
officer to sift through photos or audio files or Internet browsing history
data stored [in] the phone."32
The supreme court indicated that whether a search of a cell phone was
permissible will be a fact-specific inquiry.3 3 Given the increasing role
that cellular data plays in our lives, evidentiary issues related to the use
of such data will no doubt abound in the years to come.
B.

Exclusionary Rule and ProbationRevocation Proceedings

The state's highest court overturned a court of appeals decision
regarding a different issue related to the Fourth Amendment4-the
exclusionary rule-which restricts admission of evidence obtained during
unlawful searches.35 In Thackston v. State, 6 the court of appeals held
that the exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation proceedings.3 7
In May 2011, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision in State
v. Thackston38 and brought Georgia in line with "the majority of
jurisdictions which have considered the issue and reached a conclusion
consistent with the reluctance of courts to extend the exclusionary rule
beyond the trial setting."39 The court applied the balancing test from
Illinois v. Krull,4 ° in which the likelihood of deterrence of unlawful
searches is weighed against the costs of withholding information in the

31. Hawkins, 290 Ga. at 787, 723 S.E.2d at 926.
32. Id. at 787-88, 723 S.E.2d at 926 (alteration in original) (quoting Hawkins, 307 Ga.
App. at 257-59, 704 S.E.2d at 891-92).
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONsT. amend. M.
35. For a thorough discussion of the exclusionary rule, see Hall & Henwood, supra note
4, at 160-61.
36. 303 Ga. App. 718, 694 S.E.2d 136 (2010).
37. Id. at 722, 694 S.E.2d at 140.
38. 289 Ga. 412, 716 S.E.2d 517 (2011).
39. Id. at 415, 716 S.E.2d at 520.

40. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
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truth-seeking process." According to the supreme court, applying the
exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings provides minimal
deterrence benefits because the rule itself assumes that law enforcement
is aware that the procedure it follows in conducting searches may affect
the prosecution's ability to convict a criminal defendant. 2 Therefore,
to apply the rule to probation revocation hearings would assume that
police officers conduct searches with the knowledge that any evidence
collected could be used in such proceedings.' For the supreme court,
Further,
this was an unreasonable and unrealistic assumption."
deterring unlawful searches was sufficiently accomplished by the
application of the exclusionary rule to criminal trials. 5 The supreme
court also noted that application of the exclusionary rule beyond the trial
setting would "significantly alter and affect the proper administration of
the probation system in this state"; therefore, the benefits did not
outweigh the burdens."
Ill.

BUSINESS RECORDS HEARSAY EXCEPTION

There was significant case law during this survey period interpreting
the Georgia business records exception to the hearsay rule. O.C.G.A.
§ 24-3-14(b) 47 provides:
Any writing or record... made as a memorandum or record of any act,
transaction, occurrence, or event shall be admissible in evidence in
proof of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if the trial judge
shall find that it was mad6 in the regular course of any business and
that it was the regular course of such business to make the memorandum or record at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event
or within a reasonable time thereafter."
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Saye v. Provident Life & Accident
Insurance Co.4' held that the business records exception" does not
authorize the admission of documentary evidence of telephone conversations.5 1 The court determined that the trial court erred in admitting

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Thackston, 289 Ga. at 413, 716 S.E.2d at 518 (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 347-48).
Id. at 414-15, 716 S.E.2d at 519.
Id.
Id. at 415, 716 S.E.2d at 519.
Id.
Id. at 415, 716 S.E.2d at 519-20.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 (2010).

48. Id.
49.
50.
51.

311 Ga. App. 74, 714 S.E.2d 614 (2011).
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14(b).
Saye, 311 Ga. App. at 78, 714 S.E.2d at 619.
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the evidence of the telephone conversations between a claims representative and its insured because the document was a record of a conversation. 2
Documents were found admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14 in
Melman v. FLA Card Services, N.A.53 In Melman, FIA sued Melman
alleging that he owed $38,560 stemming from purchases and advances
paid by FIA. 5' FIA moved for summary judgment, attaching an
affidavit of an operation analyst stating that "she was familiar with
FIA's business records,.. . [the] records were kept under her supervision
and control[,] and in making the affidavit she relied upon said business
records and upon her personal knowledge."5 5 The affidavit further
alleged that Melman had applied for and obtained credit from FIA and
had not complied with demands for payment for purchases made with
said credit. Attached to the affidavit were credit card records from FIA.
The trial court granted FIA's motion, and Melman contended on appeal
that the credit card records were improperly admitted as business
records.56 The appellate court concluded that the trial court had
"liberally" but properly applied O.C.G.A. § 24-3-14(b). 57 The court
further held that the affidavit did not need to contain an express
statement attesting to the "truthfulness, accuracy[,] or completeness" of
the records in order for them to qualify as business records under the
hearsay exception.5"
Forrester v. State,59 another case during the time period covered by
this Article in which the court of appeals considered the business records
hearsay exception, illustrates the issues that arise when hearsay
exceptions are applied in criminal cases, thus implicating the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause, ° which seeks to ensure reliability
of evidence presented against a defendant in a criminal case by
"subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact." 1 In Forrester, the defendant
challenged her conviction of three counts of forgery in the first degree.
Forrester allegedly used counterfeit money orders to pay a security

52.
53.
54.

Id. at 74, 714 S.E.2d at 616.
312 Ga. App. 270, 272, 718 S.E.2d 107, 109-10 (2011).
Id. at 270, 718 S.E.2d at 108.

55. Id.
56.
57.

Id. at 270-71, 718 S.E.2d at 108-09.
Id. at 272, 718 S.E.2d at 109.

58. Id. at 272, 718 S.E.2d at 109-10.
59. 315 Ga. App. 1, 726 S.E.2d 476 (2012).
60.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

61. Forrester,315 Ga. App. at 5, 726 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 845 (1990)).
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deposit and rent payments after signing a lease on a rental property. At
trial, the only evidence introduced by the State to prove that the money
orders were counterfeit were the copies of the money orders, proffered
under the business records hearsay exception, which were stamped
"Payment Stopped Counterfeit."62
On appeal, Forrester argued that the money orders were not business
records under the hearsay exception because they reflected a conclusion
by a third party that they were counterfeit.6 3 The appellate court
agreed, noting that the testimony of the branch manager from Bank of
America, where the landlord attempted to deposit the money orders, laid
the foundation for the admission of the money orders indicating that a
third party, the originating financial institution, makes a determination
regarding the validity of the money order and then notifies the proof
department at Bank of America.'
The court also agreed with Forrester's contention that admitting the
money orders stamped "counterfeit" as proof of forgery violated her
rights under the Confrontation Clause.6" Admitting the stamp on the
money orders as proof that they were counterfeit would "deprive
Forrester of her right to conduct a thorough and sifting cross-examination on that determination."6s The court determined that if the State
were permitted to present this evidence, it would impermissibly shift the
burden to Forrester to prove that the money orders were not counterfeit,
"a burden she would have to undertake without full knowledge of the
evidence against her."67 As the stamped money orders were the only
evidence presented by the State to show that the money orders were
counterfeit, Forrester's forgery convictions were overturned. 6 This case
illustrates the importance of this hearsay exception, and the court's
opinion indicates that when a third party's conclusion is included in a
writing, the business records hearsay exception will not apply, and a
representative of that party must testify at trial.6 9

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 1-4, 726 S.E.2d at 477-79.
Id. at 4, 726 S.E.2d at 479.
Id. at 5, 726 S.E.2d at 479-80.
Id. at 5, 726 S.E.2d at 480.
Id.
Id. at 6, 726 S.E.2d at 480.
Id.
Id. at 5, 726 S.E.2d at 480 (noting that "the determination that the money orders

delivered by Forrester were counterfeit was a conclusion made by a third party institution,
whose representatives did not testify at trial").
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TEN-YEAR TIME LIMIT
O.C.G.A. §
provides that prior convictions which are
more than ten years old must survive stricter scrutiny in order to be
admissible:
IV.

PRIOR CONVICTIONS: CALCULATING THE

24-9-84.1(b) 70

[Ihf a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the witness or the defendant from the
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interest of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old, as calculated in this
subsection, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse
party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence
to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use
71
of such evidence.

In other states with similar statutes and in other cases interpreting the
Federal Rules similar to Georgia's code section, there has been much
"uncertainty about what event concludes the running of the 10-year
period." 72 During the survey period, as a matter of first impression, the
Georgia Supreme Court determined that, in Georgia, the end date for
calculating the ten-year time period after which the higher standard
kicks in is the date the witness testifies or the date that the evidence of
prior convictions is introduced.73
In setting Georgia's end date for the ten-year time limit for prior
convictions under O.C.G.A § 24-9-84.1(b), the state's highest court
considered four alternative end dates applied in other jurisdictions.7 4
The court indicated that some jurisdictions, including the Fifth Circuit,
use the date the trial commences.75 In the Eighth Circuit, the date of
the defendant's indictment is the end date for the ten-year limit.76 The
prosecution in Clay argued that the correct date should be the date

70. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (2010).
71. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b).
72. Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 833, 725 S.E.2d 260, 271 (2012) (quoting 4 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.06(2) (Joseph

M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2012)).
73. Id. at 833, 835, 725 S.E.2d at 270, 271.
74. Id. at 833, 725 S.E.2d at 271.

75. Id. (citing U.S. v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1977)).
76. Id. (citing U.S. v. Maichle, 861 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the date of the newlycharged offense."
In rejecting the State's argument, the court disagreed with the
Minnesota court's opinion that the date the witness testifies could be
manipulated to allow the time limit to expire, noting that courts have
sufficient discretion to take into account such attempted "dilatory
tactics."78 Further, the court disagreed with the prosecutions assertion
and the court's in Ihnot that there was no policy justification for setting
the date as the day the witness testifies.7 9 The court noted that "the
time of testimony is most appropriate
since the jury must determine [the
80
witness's] credibility" at that time.
V. RuLE OF COMPLETENESS
Under Georgia law, "[wihen an admission is given in evidence by one
party, it shall be the right of the other party to have the whole
admission and all the conversation connected therewith admitted into
evidence.""' The goal of this rule is to prevent litigants from putting
forth evidence, particularly "portions of prior statements taken out of
context and ... often 'essential in order to arrive at the true drift,
intent[,] and meaning of what was said on the previous occasion."'82 In
practice, the rule of completeness means that "if part of a conversation
is introduced, all that is said in the same conversation which is relevant
to the issue should be admitted. 8 3
During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the rule
of completeness in upholding Mario Westbrook's conviction of malice
murder and other crimes arising out of a shooting during a dice game in
Athens, Georgia." The State called a witness who was present at the
dice game and testified that he saw Westbrook shoot two people that
night. During cross-examination, the defense counsel asked the witness
whether he had ever told her that he did not see anyone get shot that

77. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Minn. 1998)).
78. Id. at 834, 725 S.E.2d at 271.
79. Id.; Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 585.
80. Clay, 290 Ga. at 834, 725 S.E.2d at 271 (quoting Trindle v. Sonat Marine, 697 F.
Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).
81. O.C.G.A § 24-3-38 (2010). Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides a similar rule: "If
a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may
require the introduction, at that time, of any other part - or any other writing or recorded
statement - that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." FED. R. EVID. 106.
82. Westbrook v. State, 291 Ga. 60, 62, 727 S.E.2d 473, 476 (2012) (quoting Smalls v.

State, 105 Ga. 669, 671, 31 S.E. 571, 572 (1898)).
83. Id. (quoting West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 569, 37 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1946)).
84. Id. at 61-62, 727 S.E.2d at 476-77.
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night. In response, the witness said he did not believe she had ever
asked him that question. The defense counsel called as a witness a law
student intern from her office who was present during the pretrial
conference and took notes regarding the substance of the conversation.
The intern testified that during the meeting, the witness never stated he
saw anyone get shot."
On cross-examination of the intern, the
prosecution elicited testimony that during the interview, the witness said
that he told Westbrook on the night of the crimes that "'no one has guns
because it's not the type of game where you have to worry about getting
robbed, they all know each other and wouldn't do that.' "'
The court rejected the defense's argument that the testimony was
"irrelevant to the case and to the parts of the statement introduced into
evidence by the opposing party." 7 The court held instead that the
evidence assisted in rebutting the defense's allegation that the witness
fabricated the testimony, "by showing that he had also made statements
incriminating [the] Appellant during his pre-trial interview with defense
counsel, and the statement also addressed [the] Appellant's self-defense
claim and thus was relevant to the case."' The rule of completeness
is not the most commonly discussed or analyzed rule in the Georgia
Evidence Code; however, it can prove important in practice and is a
useful tool in ensuring the opposing party is not able to mislead the jury.
VI.

PERSONAL PRACTICES OF EXPERT WITNESSES

In 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals in two cases changed a
longstanding rule that expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases
could not testify regarding their personal practices.8 9 The court in both
cases noted that differences in personal practice are insufficient to
establish a breach of the standard of care.90 However,
[n] either the jury's ability to perform its role as arbiter of the expert's
credibility, nor the party's right to a "thorough and sifting crossexamination," [O.C.G.A.] § 24-9-64, is well served by a prohibition on
cross-examination of the opposing party's expert regarding personal

85. Id. at 61-62, 727 S.E.2d at 476.
86. Id. at 62, 727 S.E.2d at 476.

87. Id. at 62, 727 S.E.2d at 476-77.
88. Id. at 62, 727 S.E.2d at 477.
89. Griffin v. Bankston, 302 Ga. App. 647, 647, 691 S.E.2d 229, 230 (2009); Condra v.
At. Orthopaedic Grp., 285 Ga. 667, 669, 681 S.E.2d 152, 153 (2009).
90. Condra, 285 Ga. at 669, 681 S.E.2d at 153; Griffin, 302 Ga. App. at 651,691 S.E.2d

at 233.
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practices that differ from the standard of care as asserted by that
expert.91
During the survey period, the court of appeals had the opportunity to
further clarify this rule, holding that the defendants were allowed to
question expert witnesses during direct examinations about whether the
expert's personal practices mirrored the defendant's conduct at issue in
the case.92
In Dendy v. Wells,9" the plaintiff alleged that the defendant orthopedic surgeon violated the "standard of care by clamping a retractor on the
plaintiff's sciatic nerve during the [hip] surgery."9' Prior to trial,
defendants filed a motion in limine, requesting the court to preclude the
plaintiff from presenting "[elvidence that the personal professional
practices of Dr. Wells, defense expert(s), plaintiff's expert(s), or treating
physicians that differ from Dr. Wells' or [his expert witness's] practice
conclusively establishes [sic] the standard of care."9 5 The motion was
96
granted.
After the plaintiff rested, the defense counsel called an orthopedic
surgeon who specialized in total hip and knee joint replacements as an
expert witness. While the expert was on the stand, defense counsel
elicited testimony regarding the standard of care applicable for this type
of surgery.9 7 The expert testified that the standard of care is a national
standard and that he understood that the standard requires physicians
to display "the skill and degree of care as employed by professionals
generally under conditions- and like surrounding circumstances. "
Subsequently, the expert testified that Dr. Wells complied with the
standard of care and that the expert employed the same method when
conducting a hip replacement surgery.9 Following a defense verdict,
the plaintiff moved for a mistrial, arguing that the defendant repeatedly
violated the motion in limine. °00 The trial court denied the plaintiff's
motion, and he appealed, arguing that the court of appeals's holdings in
Contra and Griffin did not change the prohibition under Georgia law of
eliciting testimony regarding an expert witness's personal practices on

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Condra, 285 Ga. at 671, 681 S.E.2d at 155.

Dendy v. Wells, 312 Ga. App. 309, 314, 718 S.E.2d 140, 144 (2011).
312 Ga. App. 309, 718 S.E.2d 140 (2011).
Id. at 310, 718 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. at 310, 718 S.E.2d at 142 (alteration in original).
Id. at 313-14, 718 S.E.2d at 143-44.
Id. at 312, 718 S.E.2d at 142.
Id.
Id. at 312, 718 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 313, 718 S.E.2d at 143.
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direct.'0 ' The court of appeals rejected the plaintiff's argument and
found that there was no "logical distinction" between permitting an
expert to answer questions about whether his or her personal practices
were different than the defendant's and whether they were the same, as
long as the testimony was not used to establish the standard of care.'1 2
VII.

SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

"Georgia law allows a finding of spoliation if the loss of the evidence
10 3
occurs at a time when there is 'contemplated or pending litigation.'"'
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals drew a clearer
distinction between contemplated or anticipated litigation and contemplated liability.'" In Paggett v. Kroger Co.,' the plaintiff allegedly
slipped and fell while exiting his car at a gas station owned by
Kroger. 10 6 The trial court granted Kroger's motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred
in holding that there "was no evidence of a dangerous condition at the
gas station," and the plaintiff "was not entitled to a spoliation presumption based on Kroger's inability to produce a surveillance [video] of the
" 10 7
gas station.
The plaintiff in Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin"' brought
a claim against the owner of the building in which she worked after the
door to a handicapped bathroom stall came off its hinge and knocked her
to the ground.0 9 Following the accident, an accident report was
completed, and the building's maintenance supervisor took the hinge and
put it in his truck. He could not find it when he went to look for it after
the plaintiff filed her complaint. The owner of the premises filed a
motion for summary judgment, which was denied."
On appeal, the
court examined the plaintiff's claim that the alleged spoliation supported
the trial court's denial of summary judgment."' The court disagreed,
holding that "[t]he completion of the accident report, the failed attempt

101. Id at 310, 718 S.E.2d at 141.
102. Id. at 314, 718 S.E.2d at 144.
103. Kitchens v. Brusman, 303 Ga. App. 703,707, 694 S.E.2d 667,671(2010) (quoting
Bouve & Mohr, LLC v. Banks, 274 Ga. App. 758, 762, 618 S.E.2d 650, 654 (2005)).
104. See Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ga. App. 1, 720 S.E.2d 329
(2011); Paggett v. Kroger Co., 311 Ga. App. 690, 716 S.E.2d 792 (2011).
105. 311 Ga. App. 690, 716 S.E.2d 793 (2011).
106. Id. at 690, 716 S.E.2d at 793.
107. Id.
108. 313 Ga. App. 1, 720 S.E.2d 329 (2011).
109. Id. at 1, 720 S.E.2d at 331.
110. Id. at 4-5, 720 S.E.2d at 332-33.
111. Id. at 5, 720 S.E.2d at 333.
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to retain the hinge based upon the happening of an accident alone, and
the inability to locate the hinge immediately after the lawsuit was filed
do not112demonstrate contemplated or pending litigation at the time of the
loss."

Taken together, these cases represent a clearer demarcation of when
Georgia courts will give spoliation presumptions and when Georgia
courts will refuse such presumptions.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

This survey period saw interesting and sometimes novel interpretations of various provisions of the Georgia Rules of Evidence as they
stand today. By this time next year, we may see alterations or even an
undoing of the jurisprudence described here as courts begin to grapple
with the new face of Georgia evidence.

112. Id.

